Trip Wire

As President Trump garners headlines and comment for his meetings with – potentially erstwhile – allies in Europe and President Putin, his administration is courting serious danger in Asia with the US leader firing the first salvos in his economic war against China.

The markets seem sanguine so far about what China has called the largest trade war in economic history and the $34 billion tariff package – with tariffs on a further $200 billion worth of goods in the pipeline – has seen immediate retaliation from Beijing.

The overwhelming majority of economists and trade experts question the wisdom of Trump’s tariffs. Their main objection being there is no clear end game, so this could easily escalate into a full-blown trade war damaging the US and China, and everyone else into the bargain.

More widely when it comes to China, none of Trump’s moves seem to be thought through – and here the China experts in the US are not really helping.

Trump campaigned on a belligerent anti-China ticket and as we have seen since he took office his governing style is not far removed from his campaigning style – marked by stoking grievances among his base with hostile rhetoric, shot through with lies.

After his first meeting with President Xi, it seemed he was softening – as an authoritarian leader, Xi seemed to appeal to Trump and the US also needed China’s support to ratchet up pressure on North Korea, but all that early warmth has gone.

In its new National Defense Strategy, the Pentagon has clearly identified China as its number one threat and is ramping up naval activity in the South China Sea by increasing the number of vessels it sails through the 12-mile nautical zone around Chinese-held islands in a belated attempt to push back at China’s increasing military presence and power there.

Since his election, Trump has also flirted with strengthening support for Taiwan which is particularly provocative.

Beijing regards Taiwanese independence as a red line that would trigger military action to achieve national reunification by force.

A scenario which would almost certainly also entail war with the US.

So, does Trump want war with China or is he blundering around with gesture politics without heed to the consequences?

You would expect Trump with his Sinophobic trade adviser, Peter Navarro, and his apparent willingness to let the Pentagon set military strategy, to act provocatively towards China, but despite the growing risk of conflict, the acknowledged China experts in the US are not offering much of a counter to this.

There has been a lot of soul searching of late among the American foreign policy establishment who have finally woken up to the fact China is not liberalising as it gets richer

A debate is underway among think tankers and academics about how the US should respond to China’s re-emergence as a great power.

Given this debate is ongoing and there is no clear conclusion to it yet, it would be wiser to adopt a policy of “do no harm” in the meantime and advise caution on the Trump administration.

Instead, a large number of them are urging US to push back against what they see as Chinese expansionism, rather than seek compromise with Beijing given China’s growing power is a reality and its behaviour is notably less bellicose towards its neighbours than say the US was when it was emerging on the world stage.

I had an interesting exchange with one of the younger China experts at the recent Chatham House London Conference. When I suggested the “do no harm” approach, the response was “What? And let the Chinese take over the South China Sea?”

The idea that China’s neighbours in ASEAN should deal with China on their own terms – with discreet US backing – seemed unthinkable, yet this would be a less provocative approach that recognises these countries have their own interests and agency.

Now, it is possible – even likely -Trump would not listen to such advice, but by endorsing an aggressive response to China, these experts are giving intellectual cover to the administration’s actions that appear to have no clear objective beyond the raw assertion of US power.

Donald Trump may think Thucydides is the name of a local Greek restaurant, but these experts know better.

Many have written of the need to avoid the eponymous trap as the US faces up to a rising China.

And yet – in urging push back on a bellicose, impulsive, ill-informed President, they risk bringing about a confrontation the Ancient Greek historian would instantly recognise.

They should be urging President Trump to accept the changing geopolitical landscape and advising him – in the words of one the most prescient China experts, Lyle Goldstein – to “meet China halfway”

It becomes clearer with each Tweet, Executive Order and press conference that the United States is in the throes of a chaotic attempted counter-revolution led – at least in name – by the President.

Donald Trump sees himself as a disrupter. A man who seems to respect no one, relishes in going against convention and actually abusing whoever he feels is standing in his way, including the leaders of some of America’s key allies.

Behind him are the two Stephens – Bannon and Miller – both hardline ideologues who some suspect are the real political brains in the White House.

Bannon is an extreme nationalist who, when he led the far-right website, Breitbart News, among other things, championed white supremacists. In an unprecedented move Trump put him on the National Security Council, removing key military personnel to make space.

Miller is a communications adviser who rose to prominence serving right-wing Republicans in Congress and who, at 31, is now so influential that he – rather than White House lawyers – apparently drafted Trump’s Executive Order temporarily banning immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries and the entry of all Syrian refugees (which might explain why it didn’t pass judicial scrutiny).

Some observers see Trump as Bannon’s ‘useful idiot’ but I’m not convinced.

While it’s clear Trump is ill-informed, doesn’t seem to understand the office he now holds, or be committed to much more than being the centre of attention and making money, he seems to genuinely share Bannon’s prejudices.

So, it appears those who said Trump’s opponents in the election made a mistake because they “took him literally, but not seriously”, were wrong.

They should have done both then – and certainly need to now.

Despite this, Trump’s first few weeks have shown there are some constraints on him.

Apart from the suspension of the Executive Order on immigration by the courts, his National Security Adviser, Mike Flynn, has had to resign after the media revealed he lied to the Vice President about his contacts with the Russian Ambassador in Washington, and, despite his rhetoric before taking office, he has so far maintained his predecessor’s policies on China/Taiwan and Russia.

But, he has moved to gut US action on climate change and he seems intent on neutering, if not abolishing, the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as repealing Obamacare.

Elsewhere, on the world stage, despite blinking first in his opening dealings with President Xi Jinping by assuring him the US would not depart from its traditional One-China policy, the chances of war between China and the US – either intentional or accidental – are still considerable if Trump follows through on his rhetoric on trade or the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

As a result, what many across the political spectrum are asking now is: who can protect the World from Trump and America from itself?

Ultimately, the main domestic constraint on a President is Congress. But, as yet, there is no sign enough Republicans are worried enough to take action against Trump, although they do seem concerned by his team’s contacts with Russia during and after the election, and it is always possible a Special Prosecutor could be appointed to look into this.

Whether his refusal to release his tax returns and his blurring of the lines between his personal business interests and the interests of the US government could lead to impeachment will depend on Republican Representatives and Senators deciding his actions are threatening enough to their own political interests and/or the interests of the country.

In the meantime, what can the rest of the world do?

Post-Brexit Britain – in danger, as it is, of slipping into less- than-splendid isolation – has decided to try to cosy up to Trump and is not going to publicly take him on.

China has taken the opposite tack and we’ve already seen Beijing make clear it is not going to be pushed around and – at least for now – Trump back down.

But many in the West are looking to Germany and Chancellor Merkel to stand up for them and the values of democracy and tolerance.

And Berlin seems up for it.

After Trump talked to Merkel when he first took over, the German government made clear she – albeit politely – didn’t hold back.

On the subject of refugees, Merkel’s spokesperson told the media “The Geneva Refugee Convention requires the international community to take in refugees from war on humanitarian grounds. All signatory states are expected to do so. The Chancellor explained this policy to the US President …”.

For those of a historical bent, the age old German Question has, maybe, finally found its answer with Berlin taking on the role as key defender of western values.

Quite a turnaround, given the history of the last century.

But Germany on its own can’t restrain a rogue US, so it has to be hoped the right-wing populist tide in Europe will wane, especially in France where Marine Le Pen is leading presidential opinion polls for May’s election, and the EU, which Trump wants to see collapse, will rally round Berlin and stand up to Washington.

While much of the media – especially in the Anglophone world – has been focusing on the American election and the implications of Donald Trump’s victory, there’s been a new outbreak of violence in western Myanmar that needs urgent attention before it escalates and undermines the country’s ongoing reform process.

Last month, the authorities in Rakhine state reported an attack on several police posts near the western frontier with Bangladesh in which nine policemen were killed.

The attack was blamed on Muslim insurgents – who have posed little of a threat during the country’s long history of unrest.

Last week saw  serious clashes between the army and these insurgents, who have yet to be firmly identified, but do seem to be Rohingya, that has left more than thirty dead, among them at least two soldiers.

Ever since its independence from Britain in 1947, Myanmar – or Burma as it used to be known – has experienced ethnic conflict.

At that time, several of its ethnic minorities rebelled against the central government – dominated by the Burman majority – and have been fighting ever since for greater self- government.

Until recently, Rakhine in the western part of the country had not been a major centre of unrest.

But since 2011, when the country has started to open up to the wider world and the military has gradually stepped back from running the country, Rakhine has seen an upsurge in communal violence.

It began with members of the Buddhist majority attacking and harassing people from the Muslim Rohingya minority who they regard as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

This prejudice was fuelled by the central government, which failed to take action against Buddhist extremists inciting hatred against the country’s Muslim minority.

The government has also refused to recognise the Rohingya as citizens, arguing they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Most historians, on the other hand, argue Muslims have been living in the area for hundreds of years, although in what numbers is unclear.

The argument is more than academic with the Rohingya rendered effectively stateless given they are not Bangladeshi citizens either.

The chaotic violence and international criticism of its failure to protect people forced the central government to intervene and set up camps for Rohingya who’d been driven from their homes by Buddhist violence.

Since then, Rohingya have languished in camps and many others have attempted to flee by sea to neighbouring countries.

This new wave of boat people have not been welcome in the countries where they’ve landed, principally Thailand and Indonesia, which has dimmed the prospect of finding refuge abroad.

Assuming the recent attacks are being carried out by armed Rohingya, it should  hardly come as a surprise.

All the roots of a wider insurgency have been gestating for a while.

Attacked by their neighbours, left unprotected by the security forces and with the option of seeking asylum in nearby states limited, it looks like some have decided to fight fire with fire.

By the evidence being gathered by rights groups, the Myanmar military – which has been fighting ethnic insurgent groups for seventy years – is responding in time honoured fashion.

The danger is that an insurgency based among Muslims could attract outside support and end up taking a more radical turn, as it has in other countries, like Nigeria where the Boko Haram group ended up aligning themselves with ISIS.

The fact that the country is now run by a civilian-led government under the Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi since historic elections just over a year ago, makes this turn of events even more disturbing.

Ms Suu Kyi has called for calm, but she has ducked supporting Rohingya demands for citizenship – her moral compass seems to have been distorted by electoral considerations with her desire to avoid alienating Buddhist voters overcoming her commitment to human rights.

This refusal to take a tough line in their defence has disappointed many Rohingya and may have contributed to more concluding violence is the only way to defend their community – after all if a leader who has been admired around the world for her commitment to democracy won’t help you, who will?

If this is the judgement against her, it may be a bit harsh.

Under the constitutional deal that led to the end of sixty years of direct military rule and the first competitive elections in decades which catapulted Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD into office, the military retain control over key ministries, including defence, and still have considerable freedom of action.

So the civilians don’t seem to be driving the response to the insurgency in Rakhine.

Whatever the politics in Naypyidaw, the latest violence and heavy handed response of the army pose a challenge to the authority of Ms Suu Kyi’s government and threaten to undermine her international reputation even further.

However, Ms Suu Kyi has not shown much inclination to use the clout she possesses from her own personal popularity and her party’s overwhelming electoral victory to restrain the military.

Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan had been brought in to try to find a political solution before the recent attacks on the security forces.

His efforts clearly haven’t yielded much so far– it’s time Aung San Suu Kyi put more weight behind the veteran diplomat’s push for a compromise before things get much worse.

If I had a vote in the American presidential election, I would cast it for Hillary Clinton.

Donald Trump’s opposition to action on climate change is enough of a reason to do so on grounds of policy alone

On top of that Trump has – how can I put it politely – character flaws beyond the dreams of avarice, which should disqualify him from occupying any political office, let alone the Oval one.

But, I would vote for Clinton with some trepidation for what it means for the rest of the world.

While she has one of the most progressive domestic policy platforms of any recent mainstream candidate and wouldn’t renege on climate change commitments, Clinton’s approach to foreign policy is another matter.

So whoever wins this week, the world is likely set for even more instability than we’ve seen in recent years.

Both candidates are firm believers in American exceptionalism – even if the way Clinton translates that worldview into policy is more conventional than Trump – and so international frictions will almost certainly rise over the next four years.

Why do I say that when the conventional media view is Trump poses all the risk?

Let’s take relations between the US and other major powers, like Russia and China.

Russia is the country that’s attracted the most attention during the campaign – allowing officials and media commentators to dust down the old Cold War stereotypes about the Russian threat.

Under President Obama, who came into office promising to reset the relationship with Moscow, relations have tanked and confrontation escalated, particularly over Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria, as well as over allegations of interference in each other’s internal affairs. Washington has even accused the Kremlin of attempting to influence the outcome of the election in Trump’s favour.

This may not be unconnected to the Republican candidate’s approach to Moscow.

A Trump win could well see the strains in relations with Russia ease given he clearly doesn’t see Russian actions – from Ukraine to Syria – as a threat to US national security.

But if Hillary Clinton wins, these tensions are likely to rise.

She has promised to intensify sanctions against Russia over Ukraine in particular, and the continued standoff over Syria is also likely to continue with the rhetoric turning even sourer between the two nuclear powers.

This matters because Obama’s signature policy of reducing the risk of nuclear conflict – and Russia and US have by far the largest arsenals – has made little headway and neither of his putative successors is going to pursue it.

When it comes to China, where Obama’s famous pivot, or rebalance, to Asia has seen a gradual deterioration in relations between Washington and Beijing in the past few years, things are set to get even worse – only here it is indeed Trump who poses the greatest risk to global stability.

Unlike Russia, for Donald Trump, China is a direct threat to American national interests.

If he sticks to what he’s proposed during the campaign – an even greater military build-up around China’s coast and retaliation for alleged unfair trade practices – we are headed for a major escalation in tension.

And with the impetuous, unpredictable and untested Trump as commander-in-chief, the risk that an accidental clash in the South China Sea could blow up into a major conflagration is much greater.

But given her record in office and what she’s said on the stump, even with Clinton in the White House, relations with China will probably continue their downward trajectory – if less dramatically.

Despite what she has said about increasing cooperation with Beijing in areas of mutual interest, candidate Clinton has promised a stronger line on China’s human rights record – which won’t go down well there.

On top of that, as Obama’s Secretary of State we know she was usually on the side of the greater use of American military muscle than her boss, and, as her previous dealings with Beijing indicate, her approach to the South China Sea is pretty much guaranteed to be seen by the Chinese as more provocative than the current administration’s.

Whether it’s Clinton or Trump who enters the White House next January, the first thing in the in-tray is most likely to be the campaign against Islamic State, or ISIS, in Syria and Iraq.

Both candidates have indicated they would intensify air strikes – which would inevitably lead to more civilian casualties.

The difference between them comes over the use of ground troops. Trump says he would commit more Americans, whereas Clinton would seek to continue Obama’s approach of supporting local allies to do the fighting.

Of course, all this comes with the proviso that Trump is an unknown quantity when it comes to foreign policy.  So were he to become president, there is a degree of doubt that he’d do all the things he’s said he would.

We know much more about Hillary Clinton. Her approach to the rest of the world was forged during her husband’s presidency in 1990s when the lesson she took from the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo was that military intervention stops wars and saves lives.

Given her views on Syria and Libya when she was Secretary of State it’s a fair bet she has not changed this view much, despite all the evidence that the results of large scale armed intervention are unpredictable at best and usually incur a much greater cost to civilians than anticipated.

Also – in spite of lip service to the way the world has changed with the re-emergence of the likes of China and India and the need for multilateral cooperation, under a President Clinton, we can expect the US to continue to fail to adjust its actions to rise of the rest and the shift in relative balance of power.

Here she was speaking to the American Legion a couple of months ago: “when America fails to lead, we leave a vacuum that either causes chaos or other countries or networks rush in to fill the void. So no matter how hard it gets, no matter how great the challenge, America must lead”.

After all if President Obama, who has been castigated for weakening the US role in the world still believes “the question we face …. is not whether America will lead, but how we will lead” as he told military cadets in 2014, it would be naïve to expect a departure from this way of looking at the world under Clinton.

This doesn’t bode well for the rest of us over the next few years.

A true acceptance in Washington of how the world has changed is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition to restoring some sort of order to global affairs.

As for Trump, he shows no sign of having applied much thought to such questions at all and seems inclined to shoot from the hip – and we can only hope that he’d only do that metaphorically.